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ABSTRACT
The article presents the role of artificial intelligence technology in shaping 
security on the international dimension . This particular technology serves as 
an example of modern technological innovation that could have a transfor-
mational effect on international relations by altering the capabilities of states 
(in Waltz’s terms) and thus the balance of power in the international system . 
The argumentation is divided into three sections, the first focuses on a role that 
technological factor plays in the theory of ir . The second discusses the specifics 
of how artificial intelligence technology works and elaborates on four features 
of this technology that are key from an international security perspective . 
The third section introduces a theoretical concept of Charles Weiss for render-
ing interactions between technology and the international system and uses this 
distinction to elaborate on the question of how ai may influence international 
relations in the future .
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The paper addresses three problems from the domain of international relations 
and phrases them as questions . The first general question, focused on the theo-
retical aspect of the issue, is how technological innovations impact international 
relations . The second question is aimed specifically at the technology of artifi-
cial intelligence (ai) – why ai may impact international relations on state and 
systemic levels . The last question is how ai may influence international relations . 
to answer these questions, the argument will proceed in three complementary 
stages . The first part of the paper introduces the role of technological factor in 
ir theory by referring to examples from the main paradigms (realism, idealism, 
and constructivism); it also presents a theoretical model of interactions between 
international relations and technological innovations developed by Charles 
Weiss (Weiss, 2005, pp . 295–313; Weiss, 2015, pp . 411–430) . The second part con-
sists of a short introduction to ai technology and a description of its four main 
traits significant for international relations . to better understand the specifics 
of ai, the reasoning in this part references a variety of scholars from the broad 
spectrum of ir and security studies . The final part concludes the argument and 
combines the information from two previous parts by embedding the traits of 
this technology in Weiss’ theoretical model .
The best way to tackle the multidimensional problem of the importance of ai 
technology for international relations is to adopt the analytical eclecticism de-
fined by ruda sil and peter J . Katzenstein as an “approach that seeks to extricate, 
translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements – concepts, logics, mecha-
nisms, and interpretations – of theories or narratives that have been developed 
within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive prob-
lems that have both scholarly and practical significance” (sil & Katzenstein, 
2010, p . 10) . as coherent with the eclectic approach, the quantitative approach 
including critical analysis of literature sources with elements of desk research 
methods was used to address the three focal questions of this study .
introduction
as stated by Klaus schwab (schwab, 2016, p . 2), the current international sys-
tem is transitioning into a new stage called the fourth industrial revolution, 
“fundamentally changing the way we live, work, and relate to one another . in 
its scale, scope and complexity [it] is unlike anything humankind has expe-
rienced before” . This fundamental change will be possible mainly due to new 
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technological innovations, as they are fundamental for economic development 
and military power, which in turn are essential ingredients of national power . 
Especially ai is indicated as one of the most crucial technologies in shaping 
the future international balance of power; as authors from the uK’s Ministry 
of defence stated in their Global strategic trends report, “it is plausible that by 
2050 (or perhaps before) automation and artificial intelligence will have altered 
not just the character, but very nature of war” (uK Mod, 2018, p . 144) . for Chris-
topher Coker, ai may be so important that it should be included by ir scholars 
into their scientific considerations . in the paper in honor of Kenneth n . Waltz, 
Coker implied that on the level of individuals, in the future the importance of 
human agency will wane and the role of non-human agents is bound to amplify . 
he provokingly asked: “should we see artificial intelligence as a fourth image 
to use Waltz’a methodology?” (Coker, 2018, p . 20) unfortunately, no unequivocal 
answer to the above question was provided; however, the issue of ai importance 
for contemporary and future international relations was raised, a critical remark 
by K . Waltz that “in shaping the behavior of nations, the perennial forces of 
politics are more important that the new military technology” notwithstanding 
(Waltz, 1979, p . 173) .
1. How do technological innovations impact
 international relations?
The technological factor is almost universally considered to be an essential 
element in explaining the political process . This fact can be well expressed in 
the words of Wiebe E . Bijker: “technology is vital for people, the planet and for 
creating profit, it is also important for politicians and politics, for this reason, 
is relevant to political science” (Bijker, 2006, p . 682) . The booming techno-
logical progress currently observed is, according to Bolesław Balcerowicz, one 
of the critical development megatrends shaping the international system; its 
importance (difficult to overestimate) is due to the fact that it is a sine qua non 
condition of globalization in its current setting (Balcerowicz, 2012, pp . 62–65) .
however, the importance of the technological factor is particularly evident in 
the area of security studies . according to ryszard Zięba, in the understanding of 
security by participants of international life and in the functioning of countries 
and international system, the primary importance is attributed to the scientific 
and technical revolution because “permanent scientific and technical progress is 
primarily used in military technology and serves the construction of increasingly 
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destructive and effective types of weapons” (Zięba, 2004, pp . 30–32) . Each of 
the leading paradigms of security description in the field of international rela-
tions 1 takes into account in their explanations the role of the technological factor .
of course, the importance of technological innovations is not only a result 
of recent advances – the historical examples are countless, ranging from pike to 
sailing ship, gunpowder, railroad, and combustion engine to nuclear weapons 
and machine learning (see Cipolla, 1965; Gilpin, 1981 pp . 56–59; headrick, 1981; 
Jervis, 1989; Kosal, 2020; McCarthy, 2015; Mcneill, 1988) . The significance of 
the technological factor in international relations is not disproved by ir scholars . 
on the contrary, as Geoffrey l . herrera critically noted, technological innova-
tion is admittedly present in theories of international relations, and “technol-
ogy looms across disciplines as a source of social, economic, and/or political 
change . it is often the master variable that explains everything” (herrera, 2006, 
p . 3) . herrera identified two approaches to considering the role of a technologi-
cal factor in ir literature (herrera, 2003, pp . 559, 562–563) . The first perceives 
technology as a central factor for international relations, but its operation is 
considered ad hoc – providing an ad hoc explanation of a given situation or 
change (e .g . taking into account the impact of nuclear weapons and their means 
of delivery; see Brodie, 1946), or the impact of telecommunications technologies 
on the growing interdependence (Keohane & nye, 2012) . The second approach 
also assigns central importance to technology; however, its impact is not direct 
and is a determinant of economic growth and thus indirectly of the distribution 
of potential and power in the international system (Gilpin, 1981) . describing 
the role of a technological factor in all paradigms exceeds the capacity of this 
paper, but for the sake of argumentation, the author will signal the role ascribed 
to technological innovation in three paradigms ((neo-)realism, (neo-)liberalism 
and constructivism) .
hans Morgenthau, the nestor of realism, wrote that “the fate of nations and 
civilizations has often been determined by a differential in the technology of 
warfare for which the inferior side was unable to compensate in other ways” 
(Morgenhtau, 1997, p . 139) . for him, new military technologies (nuclear weapons 
in particular) were responsible for transforming the bipolar system with easily 
defined great powers into a multipolar system with more actors empowered by 
military technologies (little, 2004, p . 155) . Waltz’s words quoted earlier should 
be treated as an exception rather than a rule, as the founding father of structural 
1 in this context, ryszard Zięba points to three main paradigms – realistic, liberal 
and constructivist (Zięba, 2017, pp . 13–26) .
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realism generally recognized the role that technology plays in shaping the capa-
bilities of the states and thus indirectly the structure of the international system . 
in his late writings, he admitted that “realist theory, old and new alike, draws 
attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy among the forces 
that fix the fate of states and their systems” (Waltz, 1998, pp . 48 –49) . The last but 
not least representative of (neo-)realism, robert Gilpin indicated that technology 
was the main factor (alongside with differential growth in power among states) 
responsible for systemic disequilibrium: “a military or technological innovation 
may dramatically reduce the cost and increase the benefits of territorial conquest 
and thereby encourage military expansion” (Gilpin, 1981, p . 22) . Briefly speaking, 
realists consider technology as an independent variable affecting the economic 
and military potential of a state, and thus co-responsible for a systemic change .
neoliberals, on the other hand, approach the role of technological innova-
tions (especially information technologies) more optimistically as a fundamental 
source of economic globalization, essential for the creation of new international 
institutions (also nonstate actors) and a condition for increasing interdepend-
ence (Keohane & nye, 2012, pp . 211–223) . technological innovations (along with 
ideational factors) are also the main force that drives change in the international 
system (nye, 201, p . 32) . alexander Wendt, here chosen as a representative of 
constructivist paradigm (which was labelled by Knud Jørgensen as the con-
structivist liberal theory of international cooperation (Jørgensen, 2018, p . 104)) 
perceives technological factor as a part of structural forces (an important mate-
rial constrain) limiting states in their actions and shaping their identity (Wendt, 
1999, pp . 110–111, 358–359) . in particular, the importance of military technolo-
gies (offensive or defensive) in international relations results from ideas, interests 
and roles (enmity or friendship) they engender and help to support . Wendt 
shows that physical artifacts acquire meaning only inside the process of defining 
foes and friends by the states: “five hundred British nuclear weapons are less 
threatening to the us than five north Korean ones because of the shared under-
standings that underpin them . What gives meaning to the forces of destruction 
are the ‘relations of destruction’ in which they are embedded: the shared ideas, 
whether cooperative or conflictual, that structure violence between states . These 
ideas constitute the roles or terms of individuality through which states interact” 
(Wendt, 1999, p . 255) .
The realists perceive technology as an independent variable that is crucial 
for building national power and state capacity; for liberals, it is a key enabler 
of economic growth and the force fuelling interdependence that connects ac-
tors in the international system; the constructivists interpret technology as 
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a context-driven variable which exerts structural pressure on states and simulta-
neously is shaped by social forces .
The impact of technological innovation on international relations is mul-
tidimensional and, among others, enables people to take actions that were 
previously impossible . This process is intensified by technology diffusion and 
competition in the technological area as well as different capacity of states to 
implement technological innovations (Gałganek, 2011, p . 15) . as previously 
electricity, railway, and telecommunications as well as nuclear weapons, ai is 
an example of large technical systems, “spatially extended and functionally inte-
grated socio-technical networks” (renate & hughes, 1988, p . 5) that are able to 
change patterns of interaction within the international system and thus change 
the structure of that system itself . such technologies are defined by G . l . herrera 
as systemic technology; they cannot be reduced to being a feature of a single 
subject of international relations and exert influence on the time and space in 
which the relations of entities forming the international system take place . at 
the same time, it mainly pertains to relationships that are both physical and 
related to mutual communication and the ability to cause harm (herrera, 2006, 
p . 26) . ai is a perfect example of next-generation technological innovations that 
may be called a systemic technology, so before addressing the question of how 
ai may influence international relations, the issue of the technology itself must 
be addressed first .
2. Why may Ai impact international relations? 2
first, a reference must be made to distinctions useful in capturing the specifics of 
ai technology – the notions of automatism, autonomy, intelligence, artificial in-
telligence, and a robot . The most extensive category is the concept of automatism, 
i .e . the ability of a system to repeatedly perform human-planned activities in 
a non-changing environment with minimal or no human interference (e .g . ma-
nipulators that assemble parts in car factories) . This category includes the other 
four concepts – autonomy, intelligence, ai and robot (hoadley & lucas, 2018, 
pp . 1–4) . autonomy is a gradual concept meaning the ability to receive stimuli 
from the environment, to plan and to implement previously made decisions to 
complete the assumed task . intelligence is “the ability to understand, learn and 
2 The following argument does not, of course, exhaust the subject of ai as it is only 
intended as an introduction to facilitate understanding of the features of the described 
technology, nor is its purpose to delve into technical issues related to the creation of ai .
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use our knowledge and skills in new situations” (inteligencja, n .d .) . There is no 
single definition of ai commonly accepted by the scientific community . Jacob 
turner concluded the review of the ai definition by indicating that “artificial 
intelligence is the ability of a non-natural entity to evaluate and make choices” 
(turner, 2018, p . 16) 3, with the use of the word “inanimate”  4 as opposed to “cre-
ated by man” (man-made) to emphasize the fact that ai is able to autonomously, 
without human intervention, improve its own code so as to e .g . create another 
ai . ai is further divided into so-called narrow, weak ai and general, strong ai . 
The first term applies to (it) systems with a sole, specific objective, e .g . speech 
recognition or driving . General ai, on the other hand, means an (it) system ca-
pable of performing many tasks, even of setting goals for itself while the system 
works without human intervention . Currently, none of the existing solutions 
can be described as such . narrow and strong ai create a particular spectrum 
of possibilities and with the passage of time and the progress of technology, as 
well as the due to the process of self-learning and improvement, ai systems will 
resemble weak ai less and will become more like general ai . it should be noted, 
however, that the very possibility of creating a general ai is often contested in 
science . The last of these concepts is a robot, i .e . a physically existing machine, 
built according to the logic of “recognize-think-act”, which must have all 
three elements: sensors (for recognizing the environment), a computing center 
(equipped with ai) and effectors (enabling interacting with the environment) 
(singer, 2009, p . 67) . in addition, a robot can be an automatic or autonomous 
system; each autonomous system must contain ai .
The main objective of developing the technology of artificial intelligence is 
to translate the humans’ way of collecting and processing information in their 
minds into a way that will enable a machine to perform mapping processing as 
an independent, autonomous action that is a necessary element of the ability to 
learn . until recently, what was dominant in the case of ai  5 was the so-called 
3 “artificial intelligence is the ability of a non-natural Entity to Make Choices by 
an Evaluative process” .
4 in this context, the notion of an actor follows the one used by the co-creator of 
Theory of network actor Bruno latour, who indicates that in order to understand the re-
lations prevailing in a society it is necessary to consider both human actors and inanimate 
actors . “an actor means everything that works, an actor is everything that is the source of 
action” . (latour, 1992, p . 256) .
5 Margaret Boden defines this type as Good old-fashion ai; in addition to the self-
learning approach using neural networks, she distinguishes also evolutionary program-
ming, cellular automata, and creating dynamic systems . (Boden, 2016, p . 6) .
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“symbolic” approach, consisting of programming the machine by providing it 
with all the necessary information that it should possess to be able to perform 
a given action . an illustration of this use was the 1997 victory of the iBM-
created computer and software system deep Blue over the chess grandmaster 
Garry Kasparov; its operation was based on the use of high computing power 
to analyze possible moves and choose the optimal one . today, the goal is to al-
low the machine to learn “independently” how to perform the operation called 
machine learning  6 . The revolutionary character of the changes described above 
was encapsulated by the Wired magazine in the slogan that the era of coding 
(writing program code for computers) is ending, and the era of machine learn-
ing is coming (tanz, 2016) . The idea is to use the capabilities of the machine to 
collect knowledge  7 coming from its own experience in order to better perform 
a given activity; what is more, this technology enables the machine to learn 
in situations of incomplete knowledge . This approach to learning machines 
typically uses a model  8 of artificial neural network  9 . The so-called deep learn-
ing involves transmission of information through multiple layers of neural  10 
6 however, this is not the only way to create ai today . for example, the libratus 
program, which in 2017 learned to “play” poker and defeated four professional players at 
this game, does not use machine learning method, but the modernized counterfactual 
regret minimization (Cfr) method, which allows the program to analyse not only pos-
sible moves, but also weaknesses in its own strategy . other methods of creating ai include 
the use of evolutionary programming, genetic algorithms, computational game theory, 
Bayesian estimation, and fuzzy logic (hsu, 2017) .
7 The data that the machine receives can be described (labelled), non-described 
(unlabelled) or the result of interaction with the environment .
8 ryszard tadeusiewicz points to three main types of neural networks: multilayer 
neural networks (multiplayer perceptron, Mlp), Kohonen’s self-learning networks (soM), 
and hopfield’s recursive networks (tadeusiewicz, 2010, pp . 1–3) .
9 one of the challenges is the fact that the machine learning process, i .e . what happens 
inside a neural network, is incomprehensible to humans, which is why one of the priorities 
is to create ai variants whose operation will be fully clear to human operators, which is 
a fundamental condition for building trust in and security of systems using this technol-
ogy . for this reason, the us defense advanced research projects agency (darpa) is 
implementing the Explainable artificial intelligence methods (see Gunning, 2017) .
10 The neural network is made up of three basic types of artificial neurons: neurons 
forming the input layer, neurons forming the hidden layer, and neurons forming the out-
put layer . for example, if a neural network learns to recognize an image, then the pixels 
that make up the digital image would be input to the external neural network .
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networks, which can be accomplished in several ways 11, including from a teacher 
(supervised learning) or through the process of self-learning (unsupervised learn-
ing) . in the first case, the teacher is a program that, based on a properly prepared 
data set 12, teaches the network by repeatedly indicating the relationship between 
data and the correct solution (identification of a category of objects, e .g . a type 
of combat vehicle) . The result is the network’s ability to properly perform tasks 
relative to data that was not a direct learning subject (e .g . detection of a given 
type of combat vehicle at different times of the day and in different atmospheric 
conditions) . learning without a teacher involves providing a network with data 
but without indicating expected answers, as a result of which the network can 
group data into various categories and indicate correlations between data by it-
self . in both cases, the key to the learning process is to provide a sufficiently large 
number of examples (e .g . millions of photos) 13 and sufficiently large computing 
power for the learning process . The approaches described above can be ordered 
into successive and overlapping development and use phases of this technology . 
in this context Kai-fu lee distinguishes four waves . The first involves the use 
of ai in the internet (e .g . content search algorithms, creating purchase recom-
mendations), the second in business (e .g . automated transactions on the stock 
exchange), the third is related to the use of ai to recognize the physical world 
(e .g . face recognition), and the fourth wave has enabled machine autonomy 
(e .g . autonomous cars) (lee, 2018, pp . 104 –139) . The aim of implementing them 
is to support the creation of more efficient business models and ultimately to 
improve the overall output of a company and the state’s economy in general . 
in the case of state actors, estimates suggest that the positive impact of ai on 
the global economy can bring growth of up to $10 .7 trillion by 2030 and will be 
11 in addition to the ways cited, methods also used include reinforcement learning, 
which uses the feedback from the environment in the form of punishment or reward, and 
the generative adversarial network, i .e . the use of two neural networks which are to learn 
based on a common data set; one independently e .g . creates a false image of a human face 
and the other tries to determine whether this image is authentic . With each attempt each 
network learns to generate false objects and recognise counterfeits (scharre & horowitz, 
2018, pp . 5–6) .
12 for example, object recognition is based on correctly describing the material used 
for learning, e .g . photos . With a sufficiently large number of examples, the machine is able 
to learn to identify a given object .
13 Just as coal was once a key raw material for steam engines and oil for internal com-
bustion engines, data will be a key raw material for ai (scharre & horowitz, 2018, p . 3) .
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particularly noticeable in China and the us – 70% of the forecast increase (26 .1% 
in China and 14 .5% in the us) (Gilham, et al ., 2018, p . 3) .
The impact of ai on international relations will not be restricted only to 
economy but will have particular influence on “hard” international security . ai 
technology is not a weapon in itself, but it does have a difficult-to-assess trigger 
potential (enabling technology) in many other areas that are crucial for both 
the economic and military power of states (horowitz, 2018, p . 6) . a legitimate 
analogy that facilitates thinking about the effects of ai implementation may be 
the emergence and popularization of electricity, a technology that has trans-
formed almost all spheres of life (ng, 2017) . in this context, it is worth recalling 
the words of Kevin Kelly, the founder of the Wired magazine, who said that ai 
“will revive objects, just as electricity did it more than a century ago . Every-
thing previously electrified will now become cognitized” (Kelly, 2014) . in turn, 
considering the fact that the ai will force the states to redefine their strategic 
calculations, Kenneth payne points to the analogy between this technology and 
the invention and proliferation of nuclear weapons (payne, 2018, pp . 15–30) . in 
other words, ai technology can be one of the leading forces influencing the sta-
bility and thus the transformation of the power structure in the international 
system . The impact of ai results from four features of this technology that are 
important from the international perspective .
first, owing to the implementation of ai, many of the existing solutions will 
gain new capabilities 14, which is associated with the ability of this technology to 
multiply force (force multiplier) . The use of ai on a large scale is to contribute to 
the rapid growth of the potential of the entity that will implement it effectively . 
in terms of security, ai will enhance and modify many aspects of combat opera-
tions (from logistics and reconnaissance to weapon design) . These changes will 
be cumulative and will lead to qualitative transformation at some point . The key 
is, however, that systems using ai will have an advantage over traditional solu-
tions, mainly due to the shortened response and action time . This fact gives ai 
a significant superiority over people and is the reason why decisions related to 
military operations can be automated at both strategic and tactical level . The in-
creasing speed of action on the battlefield (in each of the domains 15) will require 
14 E .g . an ordinary lorry supplemented with a set of appropriate sensors and a com-
puter enabling the vehicle to move without a man behind the wheel (sydney, 2018) .
15 so, in the air, on land, on and under water, in space and in cyberspace .
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faster reactions 16, which means that the role of autonomous systems (including 
combat systems) will increase, strengthening trends in reducing human pres-
ence on the battlefield (depopulation of the battlefield and dehumanization of 
warfare) . in addition, predictable behavior on the future battlefield will mean 
imminent death, while unpredictability will clearly increase the chance of sur-
viving and completing the task .
What is more, in cyberspace autonomy is one of the key elements of both of-
fensive and defensive activities, which can be illustrated by the use of the stuxnet 
virus, which autonomously conducted activities aimed at i .a . changing the mode 
of operation of iranian devices responsible for the uranium enriching centrifuges 
in such a way as to physically damage them (scharre, 2018, p . 193) . This cor-
responds with an argument made by an offensive realist John Mearsheimer at 
the beginning of the 20th century: he claimed that war should still be treated by 
nation-states as a real “tool” that can be used to increase their share of world 
power (Mearsheimer, 2001) . The argument is especially relevant in the context 
of the future of ai implementation, when military actions will probably be 
conducted simultaneously in the real world as well as in the cyber domain by 
autonomous systems . in this context, it should be noted that the implementa-
tion of ai technologies is accompanied by severe ethical and legal doubts as well 
as related to arms control . Currently, there is still no worldwide consensus on 
the admissibility of the use of autonomous weapon systems on the battlefield . 
Moreover, futurists point to a scenario in which the most advanced version (de 
facto a general ai) theoretically may initiate a process called the mechanism 
of recursive self-improvement (see yampolskiy, 2015) . This concept assumes 
that when a self-learning ai is invented, it will initiate a process of constantly 
enhancing its own abilities or the capabilities of the state or non-state actors that 
manage to create such technology .
ai technology is being developed both in countries with liberal democratic 
systems as well as authoritarian states (see harari, 2018; horowitz, 2018) . and 
as peter liberman shows in his seminal book, new communication technologies 
may improve the output of the economy but, contrary to liberal vision, those 
technologies may also be adopted in a more orwellian style by non-democratic 
governments to strengthen and secure their political position (liberman, 1996, 
p . 28) . China’s Social Ranking System (srs) may serve as an example illustrat-
ing the implementation of solutions that may provide new opportunities for 
16 Gen . John r . allen and amir husain referred to the next generation war with 
the militant use of ai on a massive scale as hyper war (allen & hussain, 2017) .
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economic growth in a country with an undemocratic system . The srs is based on 
monitoring citizens’ activity and awarding them points, and a sufficiently high 
result is necessary to e .g . use air or rail connections (Botsman, 2017, pp . 150–60, 
168–170) . although the program’s goal is to influence the level of social trust, it 
can also result in providing data that allows more efficient functioning of exist-
ing business models and creating new ones .
The force multiplier feature of this technology is associated with the second 
aspect of this technology . state elites may begin to perceive the role of ai in 
a unique way, different from other technologies, so that in the eyes of many 
countries, work on its development may resemble a race, driven by the belief that 
whoever is the first to implement this technology in its economy and/or armed 
forces, they will achieve a strategic advantage over other entities (first mover 
advantage) 17 . This in turn may be conducive to taking preventive measures by 
states, aimed at limiting the pace of development of other entities . an example of 
such action may be the us placing microprocessors on the list of goods banned 
from sale to China (feng & hilie, 2018) as well as sanctions targeted at Chinese 
high technology sector companies (Kozieł, 2019) .
The problem is also how to estimate the potential of the country implementing 
this technology – ai cannot be quantified . it does not resemble known physical 
weapon systems such as tanks, aircraft carriers or intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles . to estimate the power of a given army, until now it was enough to count 
how many copies of a given type of weaponry it had . in the case of ai, such 
a comparison can be complicated, and thus attempts to create any arms control 
regime in this respect will be extremely difficult, if possible at all . also, whose 
ai solutions are better can be seen only when the systems using this technology 
are confronted . as a result, it is challenging to classify ai as a technology that 
will support stabilisation of international order (see scharre, 2018, pp . 26–33) . 
robert Keohane and Joseph nye are right when they notice that the “informa-
tion technology has some effects on the use of force that benefit the small and 
some that favor the already powerful (…) . Many of the relevant technologies 
17 at the same time, it should be emphasised that the invention of a given technol-
ogy does not automatically mean that it will be used in an optimal way; for example, in 
the 19th century all countries had access to rail, firearms and telegraph, but it was only 
prussia that created a coherent strategy for using all these inventions and translated them 
into military successes . a similar case was the tank, invented in Great Britain and france 
in the first years of World War i, but first used effectively on a large scale by the Third 
reich during World War ii .
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are available in commercial markets, and weaker states can be expected to have 
many of them” (Keohane & nye, 2012, p . 218) . That is the reason why nation 
states are putting an effort into developing ai technology . By mid-2018, twenty-
four countries, as well as the European Commission and eight nordic and 
Baltic states (nB8), adopted ai development strategies (dutton 2018; cf . dutton 
2018b) . China planned to create an ai-based market worth 20 .5 billion dollars 
by 2030, with r&d spending in this area increasing from $40 .8 million to $412 
million between 2000 and 2016 . in 2016, the us allocated $1 .2 billion to develop 
this technology (of which $600 million was the budget of the us department of 
defense), while in the same year american companies invested in the develop-
ment of ai between $20 and 30 billion (fundacja digitalpoland, 2018, pp . 47–48, 
56, 35) .
Thirdly, this is a dual-use technology which is being developed by both 
the private entities 18 as well as public ones from the economic and military 
sphere of the state . transnational corporations are the main driving forces be-
hind the development of this technology . That is why the use of ai technology, 
e .g . in the process of image recognition or decision-making, blurs the border 
between civil and military applications . Moreover, ai is largely developed in 
an open manner, mainly by private and academic entities, focused on profit and 
attracting investors . openness manifests itself e .g . in that the discoveries in this 
field are often published in scientific journals and are the subject of a global aca-
demic debate, so such information easily penetrates the mass media sphere . as 
a software-based technology, ai is largely characterised by wide access to open 
source solutions that may find military use (see léveillé, 2019); moreover, state 
actors (e .g . China) use non-illegal (extra-legal transfers) methods of acquisition 
and transfer of technological knowledge to the business entities they support  19 . 
in the above context, the fundamental dilemma is the extent to which ai solu-
tions developed in the private sector may be used – contrary to their original 
purpose – to cause harm to someone (Malicious use of AI) (pohler, et al ., 2018, 
p . 3) and whether they can be used in the military sphere to achieve a multiplier 
effect . an example illustrating how real the latter possibility may be is the Maven 
project, developed in cooperation between the us department of defense (us 
18 The leaders include american entities: Google, apple, facebook and amazon 
(“Gafa”) and Chinese entities: Baidu, alibaba and tencent (“Bat”) .
19 such instruments include exchanges of scientists, organization of scientific com-
petitions, and establishment of joint science and research centres (see hannas & hannas, 
2019, pp . 3–21) .
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dod) and Google . its goal was to use ai to support intelligence activities by 
automating the process of identifying targets in video materials collected and 
sent e .g . by unmanned vehicles . The project used the tensorflow library made 
available as free access (rickli, 2019, pp . 91–92) .
The fourth feature is the disruptive nature of the ai . in history, technological 
breakthroughs (e .g . firearms) often created a definite advantage for a small group 
of countries, but as andrew f . Krepnevich notes, this advantage did not last 
long, and since the napoleonic times this period has been shortening more and 
more: “armed forces, if they want to draw from the advantages of access to new 
technology must be quickly used before the major rivals copy or compensate for 
the advantage” (Krepinevich, 1994, p . 37) . Moreover, ai seems to be a technology 
prone to proliferation . to predict the speed of diffusion of technological innova-
tions, daniel W . drezner used classification consisting of two pairs of variables . 
The first set focuses on fixed costs needed to develop a particular technology, and 
the second takes into consideration whether technology is developed by public 
or private entities . a combination of these variables allows constructing a 2x2 
matrix (see table 1) . ai is a technology with relatively low fixed costs as private 
corporations play a dominant role in its development . a pace of ai prolifera-
tion may be very rapid because, as drezner stated, “The more that technology 
approaches the general purpose category, the more quickly it will diffuse across 
the globe . The lower the fixed costs – whether material, organizational, or so-
cietal in nature – the more rapidly a technology should diffuse from leader to 
laggards” (drezner, 2019, p . 7) .
Table 1. A typology of technological innovation
Public sector dominance Private sector dominance
High fixed costs Prestige tech
e.g. nuclear weapons, manned space 
exploration, supersonic transport planes,
Strategic tech
e.g. 5G networks
Low fixed costs Public tech
e.g. Public health innovation like vaccines
General purpose tech
e.g. drones, Artificial Intelligence
Source: Drezner, 2019, p. 7.
it should be noted here that, while the technologies previously developed in 
strict secrecy (e .g ., radar detection (stealth)) were of physical nature –the process 
of their duplication (both legal and illegal) required involvement of significant 
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resources – computer-based technologies are more easily replicable . What is 
more, inventions were repeatedly developed in various places at the same time, 
which meant that the gap between the armed forces that were the first to use 
a given weapon system and other actors was reduced even faster (submarines, 
tanks, nuclear weapons) . in addition, the availability of commercial solutions 
seems to have contributed, as never before, to a situation in which the pace of 
some information technology development is accelerating, causing the technol-
ogy gap between countries and enterprises to be reduced at an even faster rate .
all four features make ai a technology particularly important for interna-
tional relations, mainly because they may influence the potential and capabili-
ties that are at states’ disposal, and together they may generate transformative 
impulse for the international system .
3. Conclusion: How may Ai influence international relations?
The importance of ai for international relations may be reaffirmed by Charles 
Weiss’ model . in order to signal the possible areas of the impact of ai technology 
on (the system of) international relations, the author will use the theoretical con-
ceptualizations of Charles Weiss; as one of the few theorists who have attempted 
to systematise the impact of new technologies on global politics, he indicated 
a total of eight connections binding these two (Weiss, 2005, pp . 297–299) 20 . first, 
technology directly affects international relations because it enables creation 
of new things that have a direct impact on world politics (e .g . the invention of 
nuclear weapons has resulted in changes in the way of constructing a balance 
of power) . secondly, this influence is also manifested in the diffusion of new 
technology – the speed at which it becomes available to other actors, affecting 
the distribution of power in the international system . Thirdly, technology affects 
international relations because it is an important element of competition between 
countries (e .g . in the form of an arms race) . fourthly, technology has an impact 
on international relations by diversifying the capabilities that states have in 
effective technology management, which translates into the economic position 
of a given state . in addition, international relations directly affect technology 
20 This author indicates a total of six mutual relations connecting the three compo-
nents indicated by him: international relations, exact sciences (i .e . knowledge of the world 
ordered by scientific method) and technologies (i .e . application of scientific knowledge) . 
The argument cites the characteristics of interrelationships between technology and 
international relations .
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through the attitude of public opinion towards various technologies, which may 
influence the level of financing they receive . secondly, foreign policy objectives 
directly translate into funded research programs . Thirdly, international relations 
affect the level and intensity of inter-state migration of scientists and the level 
of freedom in conducting research (see Wojciuk, 2016) . fourthly, this impact is 
visible in the agreements protecting intellectual property and indirectly through 
the norms of international law . These interactions were collected by the author 
in the table below (see table 2) . The strength of the predicted effect of each of 
the features on the particular elements is described on a scale from very strong 
(+++), to medium (++), to moderate (+) .
Table 2. Impact of AI on relationships in the international system
AI features
Influence of technology on international 
relations according to Charles Weiss
Multiplier 
character










Creation of new artefacts that have a direct 
impact on world politics +++ ++ ++ +++
New technology diffusion + +++ +++ +++
An important element of competition 
between countries +++ +++ + +
Capacity differentiation, which translates 
into the economic position of the state +++ +++ ++ ++
Influence of international relations on 
technology according to Charles Weiss
Attitude of the public opinion towards 
various technologies influences their 
financing level
+++ +++ ++ +++
Foreign policy goals directly translate into 
funded research programs +++ +++ + ++
International relations affect the level and 
intensity of inter-state migration of scientists 
and the level of freedom of research 
introduction
+ + ++ +++
Agreements protect intellectual property and 
international law standards ++ ++ +++ ++
Source: author’s own study.
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ai significance stems from the fact that it plays an important role in all 
interactions indicated in the model between this technology and international 
relations . however, what is particularly significant from this perspective is 
the effects of the multiplier nature of this technology, which has a bearing on 
the diversification of the capacity and economic position of the state and thus 
its military power and scope of influence on the international system . This does 
not create favourable conditions for promoting peace and stability; as Joseph 
nye and david Welch pointed out, “When the prevailing military technology 
is believed to favor the offense, decision makers feel pressure to strike the first 
blow . When it is believed to favor the defense, they do not” (nye & Welch, 2014, 
p . 57) . Moreover, non-state entities, including transnational corporations often 
develop dual-use projects, thereby facilitating the proliferation of this technol-
ogy, and thus they play a special role in turning civil ai technology into military 
capabilities . This may also express more significant support for offensive ac-
tivities (hoadley & lucas, 2018, p . 41), including in particular a new type of 
kinetic activity (e .g . through cyberspace) (spiegeleire, Maas & sweijs, 2017, p . 61) . 
Bearing this in mind, henry Kissinger (together with the former chairman of 
alphabet and the dean of Mit) expressed the fear that in the future in which 
ai will co-develop weapon systems and the tactics for using them on the bat-
tlefield, it will not be possible to uphold the concepts of deterrence and balance of 
power – the foundations of peaceful coexistence of states (Kissinger, et al ., 2018) . 
since, unlike previous weapon systems, the potential of ai cannot be measured 
in a way other than by direct confrontation, countries will be even more likely to 
hide the capabilities of their solutions that use this technology . Each of these facts 
is conducive to the emergence of the mechanism of a new arms race, at the end of 
which may also lie a transformation of the current international system .
particular attention should be drawn to the question of how the develop-
ment of ai will affect the international balance of power and the contemporary 
us-China rivalry . in this context an observation made by John Mearsheimer 
seems to be very accurate – “great powers always prefer to be the first to develop 
new technologies; they have to make sure that their opponents do not beat 
them to the punch and gain the advantage for themselves” (Mearsheimer, 2001, 
p . 232) . us and China are at the beginning of a technological race for dominance 
in ai and, according to the Centre for data innovation report, out of six key 
fields for ai development in 2019, the us was a leader in four (access to talented 
employees, research, development, computer equipment), and China in two 
(implementation, access to data) (Castro, et al ., 2019, p . 3) . in this context, Kai-fu 
lee is convinced that Chinese technology companies will gradually gain and 
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increase advantage over their american counterparts (lee, 2018, passim) . This is 
due to the fact that the Chinese state directly interferes in the market supporting 
key enterprises . What is more, the current level of development of this technol-
ogy requires not so much innovation (the strength of the us), but numerous 
human resources capable of implementing this technology (China’s advantage) . 
in addition, Chinese companies compete in a less restrictive environment to 
protect intellectual property and access to data; they are forced to compete even 
more than american entities . it seems likely that Chinese ai solutions will be 
implemented faster than those from the us, which can give China an upper 
hand in the future .
The rise of ai enables a future scenario for the transformation of the global 
order, in which the world will be divided into two separate, internally uniform 
blocs, and this division will embrace political as well as cultural (e .g . attitude 
toward the role of autonomous systems) and technological issues . The core of 
the first camp will be formed around the us and its closest allies (australia, 
Canada, Japan, and probably most of the Eu countries), while the second camp 
will be populated by states willing to accept China’s political model and tech-
nological solutions developed by Chinese companies (ranging from weapon 
systems to 5G communication) . The rest of the world will be under constant 
economic and political pressure from both camps . in this scenario, the economic 
potential of the countries that effectively adopt ai will be multiplied; however, 
in terms of potential the new world order will resemble the current one with two 
major differences – there will be two easily distinguishable camps and, thanks 
to adoption of ai, the gap between the most developed/advanced countries and 
the rest will develop faster, and will grow wider than ever before .
REFERENCES
allen, J . r ., & husain, a . (2017, Jul) . on hyperwar . Proceedings, 143 . retrieved from 
https://www .usni .org/magazines/proceedings/2017/july/hyperwar
artificial intelligence – a strategy for European startups . (2018) . retrieved from 
https://asgard .vc/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-strategy-for-
Europe-2018 .pdf
Balcerowicz, B . (2012) . procesy międzynarodowe . tendencje i megatrendy . in r . Kuź-
niar, B . Balcerowicz, & a . Bieńczycka-Missala (eds .), Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodo-
we (pp . 59–79) . Warszawa: Wydawnictwo scholar .
Beckley, W . (2018, fall) . The power of nations . Measuring What Matters . International 
Security, 43(2), 7–44 .
TheoreTical Premises of The imPacT of arTificial inTelligence  175
Bijker, W . (2006) . Why and how technology matters . in r . E . Goodin, & C . tilly (eds .), 
The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis (pp . 707–721) . new york: 
oxford university press .
Boden, M . a . (2016) . AI: Its Nature and Future . oxford: oxford university press .
Botsman, r . (2017) . Who Can You Trust? How Technology Brought Us Together and Why 
It Might Drive Us Apart. new york: hachette Book Group .
Brodie, B . (1946) . The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order . new york: har-
court, Brace and Company .
Buzan, B ., & little, r . (2011) . Systemy międzynarodowe w historii świata . Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo naukowe pWn .
Castro, d ., Mclaughlin, M ., & Chivot, E . (2019) . Who is Wining the ai race: China, the uE 
or the united states? retrieved from http://www2 .datainnovation .org/2019-china-eu-
us-ai .pdf
Cipolla, C . (1965) . Guns, Sails and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early 
Phases of European Expansion, 1400–1700 . new york: pantheon Books .
Coker, C . (2018, apr) . still ‘the human thing’? technology, human agency and the fu-
ture of war . International Relations, 32(1), 1–27 . retrieved from http://eprints .lse .
ac .uk/87629/1/Coker_human%20Thing .pdf
drezner, d . (2019, Mar) . technological change and international relations . International 
Relations, 33(2), 286–303 .
dunne, t . (2008) . The English school . in C . reus-smit, & d . sindal (eds .), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations (pp . 267–285) . oxford: oxford university press .
dutton, t . (2018) . an overview of national ai strategies . retrieved from https://me-
dium .com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-strategies-2a70ec6edfd
dutton, t . (2018b) . Building an ai World: report on national and regional ai strate-
gies . retrieved from https://www .cifar .ca/cifarnews/2018/12/06/building-an-ai-
world-report-on-national-and-regional-ai-strategies
feng, E ., & hillie, K . (2018, dec 3) . China vulnerable in war with us over computer 
chips . Financial Times . retrieved from https://www .ft .com/content/4a855aa6-f3b2-
11e8-ae55-df4bf40f9d0d
freedeberg, s . J . (2018, aug 20) . army Wants 70 self-driving supply trucks by 2020 . 
Breaking Defense . retrieved from https://breakingdefense .com/2018/08/army-
wants-70-self-driving-supply-trucks-by-2020/
fundacja digitalpoland . (2018) . Przegląd Strategii Rozwoju Sztucznej Inteligencji 
na Świecie . retrieved from: https://www .digitalpoland .org/assets/publications/
przegl%C4%85d-strategii-rozwoju-sztucznej-inteligencji-na-swiecie/przeglad-
strategii-rozwoju-ai-digitalpoland-report .pdf
Gałganek, a . (2011) . Maszyny wojny . technologia militarna w społecznej historii sto-
sunków międzynarodowych . Przegląd Strategiczny, 2, 15–41 .
Gillham, J ., rimmington, l ., dance, h ., verweij, G ., rao, a ., roberts, K . B ., & paich, M . 
(2018) . The macroeconomic impact of artificial intelligence . retrieved from https://
176  Błażej  Sajduk
www .pwc .co .uk/economic-services/assets/macroeconomic-impact-of-ai-technical-
report-feb-18 .pdf
Gilpin, r . (1981) . War and Change in World Politics . Cambridge: Cambridge university 
press .
Government artificial intelligence readiness index 2019 (2019) . retrieved from https://
www .oxfordinsights .com/ai-readiness2019
Gunning, d . (2017) . Explainable artificial intelligence . retrieved from https://break-
ingdefense .com/2017/07/artificial-stupidity-learning-to-trust-the-machine/
hannas, W . C ., & hannas, C . h . (2019) . China’s access to foreign ai technology . 
retrieved from https://cset .georgetown .edu/wp-content/uploads/CsEt_China_ac-
cess_to_foreign_ai_technology .pdf
harari, y . n . (2018, oct) . Why technology favors tyranny . The Atlantic . retrieved 
from https://www .theatlantic .com/magazine/archive/2018/10/yuval-noah-harari-
technology-tyranny/568330/
headrick, d . r . (1981) . Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in 
the Nineteenth Century. new york: oxford university press .
herrera, G . l . (2003) . technology and international systems . Millennium, 32, 559–593 .
herrera, G . l . (2006) . Technology and International Transformation. The Railroad, 
the Atomic Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Change . new york: state univer-
sity of new york .
hoadley, d . s ., & lucas, n . J . (2018) . artificial intelligence and national security . re-
trieved from https://fas .org/sgp/crs/natsec/r45178 .pdf
horowitz, M . C . (2018, apr 23) . The promise and peril of military applications of artifi-
cial intelligence . Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . retrieved from https://thebulletin .
org/landing_article/the-promise-and-peril-of-military-applications-of-artificial-
intelligence/
horowitz, M . C . (2018, May) . artificial intelligence, international Competition, and 
the Balance of power . Texas National Security Review, 1(3) . retrieved from https://
tnsr .org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/tnsr-vol-1-iss-3_horowitz .pdf
hsu, J . (2017) . Meet the new ai Challenging human poker pros . retrieved from https://
spectrum .ieee .org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/meet-the-new-ai-
challenging-human-poker-pros
hughes, t . p . (1994) . technological Momentum . in M . r . smith, & l . Marx (eds .), Does 
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (pp . 101–114) . 
Cambridge, Ma: Massachusetts institute of technology press .
inteligencja [def .1] . (n .d .) . in Słownik Języka Polskiego . retrieved from https://sjp .pwn .
pl/sjp/inteligencja;2561737 .html
Jervis, r . (1989) . The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of 
Armageddon . ithaca, ny: Cornell university press .
Jørgensen, K . E . (2018) . International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (2nd ed) . 
london: palgrave .
TheoreTical Premises of The imPacT of arTificial inTelligence  177
Kelly, K . (2014, oct) . The Three Breakthroughs That have finally unleashed ai on 
the World . Wired . retrieved from https://www .wired .com/2014/10/future-of-artifi-
cial-intelligence
Keohane, r . o ., & nye, J . s . (2012) . Power and Interdependence . Boston: pearson .
Kissinger, h . a ., schmidt, E ., & huttenlocher, d . (2019, apr) . The alpha Zero paradox . 
The Atlantic . retrieved from https://www .theatlantic .com/magazine/archive/2019/08/
henry-kissinger-the-metamorphosis-ai/592771/
Kosal, M . (ed .) . (2020) . Disruptive and Game Changing Technologies in Modern Warfare . 
n .p .: springer international . doi: 10 .1007/978-3-030-28342-1
Kozieł, h . (2019, feb 6) . amerykanie znów chcą dobrać się do skóry chińskiemu ZtE . 
Cyfrowa Rp.pl . retrieved from https://cyfrowa .rp .pl/globalne-interesy/31259-
chinski-zte-zagrozony-kolejnymi-sankcjami
Krause, K . (1992) . Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade . Cam-
bridge: Cambridge university press .
Krepinevich, a . f . (1994) . Cavalry to Computer: The pattern of Military revolutions . 
The National Interest, 37, 30–42 .
Krishna-hensel, s . f . (2010) . technology and international relations . in 
r . Marlin-Bennett (ed .), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 
(pp . 1–16) . retrieved from http://oxfordre .com/internationalstudies/view/10 .1093/
acrefore/9780190846626 .001 .0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-319#acrefore-
9780190846626-e-319-div1-0003
Krzyżanowska-skowronek, i . (2013) . Teorie zmiany: między pozytywizmem a postpozy-
tywizmem . in E . haliżak, & M . pietraś (eds .), Poziomy analizy stosunków między-
narodowych (pp . 183–205) . Warszawa: Wydawnictwo rambler .
latour, B . (1992) . Where are the Missing Masses? sociology of a few Mundane arte-
facts . in W . Bijker, & J . law (eds .), Shaping Technology, Building Society. Studies in 
Sociotechnical Change (pp . 226–258) . Cambridge, Ma: Mit press .
lee, K . (2018) . AI Superpower . China Silicon Valley and the New World Order . new 
york: hughton Miffin harcourt .
léveillé, J . (2019) . Embrace open-source Military research to Win the ai Competition . 
retrieved from https://warontherocks .com/2019/10/embrace-open-source-military-
research-to-win-the-ai-competition/
liberman, p . (1996) . Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societ-
ies . princeton: princeton university press .
little, r . (2004) . The balance of power in politics among nations . in M . Williams (ed .), 
Realism Reconsidered. The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations 
(pp . 137–165) . oxford: oxford university press .
McCarthy, d . (2015) . Power, Information Technology, and International Relations 
Theory . oxford: palgrave .
Mearsheimer, J . (2001) . The Tragedy of Great Powers . new york, london: W .W . norton 
& Company .
178  Błażej  Sajduk
Morgenthau, h . (1997) . Politics Among Nations. The Struggle For Power And Peace (6th 
ed .) . Beijing: peking university press .
ng, a . (2017, apr 28) . artificial intelligence is the new Electricity . Medium . retrieved 
from https://medium .com/@synced/artificial-intelligence-is-thenew-electricity-
andrew-ng-cc132ea6264
nye, J . s . (2011) . The Future of Power . new york: public affairs .
nye, J . s ., & Welch, d . a . (2014) . Understanding Global Conflict & Cooperation: Intro to 
Theory & History (9th ed .) . london: pearson .
parker, G . (1988) . The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 
1500–1800 . new york: Cambridge university press .
payne, K . (2018) . artificial intelligence: a revolution in strategic affairs . Survival: 
Global Politics and Strategy, 60(5), 15–30 . retrieved from https://www .iiss .org/
publications/survival/2018/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-octobernovember-
2018/605-02-payne
pohler, l ., schrader, v ., ladwein, a ., & Keller, f von . (2018) . a technological perspec-
tive on Misuse of available ai . retrieved from https://www .consciouscoders .io/
wp-content/uploads/2018/08/a_technological-perspective_on_Misuse_of_avail-
able_ai-1 .pdf
renate, M ., & hughes, t . p . (1988) . foreword . in M . renate, & t . p . hughes (eds .), Devel-
opment Of Large Technical Systems (vol . 5–7) . Colorado: Westview press .
rickli, J .-M . (2019) . The destabilizing prospects of artificial intelligence for nuclear strat-
egy deterrence and stability . in v . Boulanin (ed .), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence 
on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk (pp . 91–98) . stockholm: sipri . retrieved from 
https://www .sipri .org/sites/default/files/2019-05/sipri1905-ai-strategic-stability-
nuclear-risk .pdf
scharre, p . (2017) . a security perspective: security Concerns and possible arms Control 
approaches . in united nations office for disarmament affairs (unoda), Perspec-
tives on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems . UNODA Occasional Papers, 30, 19–33 . 
retrieved from https://www .unog .ch/80256Edd006B8954/(httpassets)/6866E44a
dB996042C12581d400630B9a/$file/op30 .pdf
scharre, p . (2018) . Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War . new 
york, london: W . W . norton & Co .
scharre, p ., & horowitz, M . (2018, Jun) . artificial intelligence . What Every policymaker 
needs to Know . retrieved from https://s3 .amazonaws .com/files .cnas .org/docu-
ments/Cnas_ai_final-v2 .pdf?mtime=20180619100112
scharre, p ., & horowitz, M . C . (2015) . an introduction to autonomy in Weapon sys-
tems . retrieved from https://s3 .amazonaws .com/files .cnas .org/documents/Ethical-
autonomy-Working-paper_021015_v02 .pdf?mtime=20160906082257
schwab, K . (2016) . The Fourth Industrial Revolution . new york: Crown Business .
sil, r ., & Katzenstein, p . J . (2010) . Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of 
World Politics . new york: palgrave Macmillan .
TheoreTical Premises of The imPacT of arTificial inTelligence  179
singer, p . W . (2009) . Wired for War: The Robotic Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-
first Century . new york: The penguin press .
spiegeleire, s ., Maas, M ., & sweijs, t . (2017) . artificial intelligence and The future of 
defence . strategic implications for small- and Medium-sized forces providers . 
retrieved from https://hcss .nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/artificial%20intel-
ligence%20and%20the%20future%20of%20defense .pdf
tadeusiewicz, r . (2011) . introduction to intelligent systems . in B . M . Wilamowski 
& J . d . irwin (eds .), The Industrial Electronic Handbook: Intelligent Systems (2nd ed .) . 
new york: CrC press .
tanz, J . (2016, May) . The end of code . Wired. retrieved from https://www .wired .
com/2016/05/the-end-of-code/
temby, o . (2013) . What are levels of analysis and what do they contribute to interna-
tional relations theory? Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28(4), 1–22 . doi: 
10 .1080/09557571 .2013 .831032
turner, J . (2018) . Robot Rules. Regulating Artificial Intelligence . london: palgrave Mac-
millan .
united Kingdom’s Ministry of defence (uK Mod) . (2019) . Global Strategic Trends. 
The Future Starts Today . retrieved from https://assets .publishing .service .gov .uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771309/Global_strate-
gic_trends_–_The_future_starts_today .pdf
Waltz, K . (1998) . War in neorealist Theory . in r . rotberg, & r . Theodore (eds .), The Ori-
gins and Prevention of Major Wars (pp . 39–52) . Cambridge: Cambridge university 
press .
Waltz, K . n . (1959) . Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis . new york: Colum-
bia university press .
Waltz, K . n . (1979) . Theory of International Politics . Massachusetts-California-amster-
dam-sydney: addison-Wesley publishing Company .
Waltz, K . n . (1990) . nuclear Myths and political realities . American Political Science 
Review 84(3), 731–45 .
Weiss, C . (2005) . science, technology and international relations . Technology in Society, 
27, 295–313 .
Weiss, C . (2015) . how do science and technology affect international affairs? Minerva, 
53, 411–430 .
Wendt, a . (1999) . social Theory of international politics . Cambridge: Cambridge uni-
versity press .
Wojciuk, a . (2016) . Imperia wiedzy . Edukacja i nauka jako czynnik siły państwa na 
arenie międzynarodowej . Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe scholar .
yampolskiy, r . v . (2015) . on the limits of recursively self-improving AGI . in J . Bieger, 
B . Goertzel, & a . potapov (eds .), Artificial General Intelligence: 8th International 
Conference, AGI 2015, AGI 2015, Berlin, Germany, July 22-25, 2015, Proceedings 
180  Błażej  Sajduk
(pp . 394–403) . n .p .: springer international publishing . doi: 10 .1007/978-3-319-
21365-1_40
Zehfuss, M . (2002) . Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality . 
Cambridge: Cambridge university press .
Zięba, r . (2004) . Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: koncepcje – struktury 
– funkcjonowanie (4th ed .) . Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe scholar .
Zięba, r . (2017) . Bezpieczeństwo w ujęciu różnych paradygmatów naukowych . in 
r . skarzyński, & E . Kużelewska (eds .), Bezpieczeństwo. Dyscyplina nauki wobec 
funkcjonowania państwa (pp . 13–26) . Białystok: agencja Wydawnicza Ekopress .
